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Some recent aristotelian scholarship, predominantly German in inspiration, has stirred 
speculation about the authenticity of the body of Aristotle's writings, the so-called corpus 
aristotelicum.1 The doubts about authenticity originate from a reconsideration of reports about 
the transmission of the aristotelian library which are found in some ancient writers. In his work, 
"The Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents,"2 Peirce uses an account, found in 
both Strabo and Plutarch, to explain textual problems encountered in reading Aristotle as well as 
to exemplify his own method of abductive reasoning. Although Peirce himself does not question 
the Stagirite's ultimate authorship of the corpus, he deliberately chooses to take the reports of 
ancient authors seriously and seems to display a sharper historical perspicacity and a greater 
textual sensitivity than many of his contemporaries in this matter.  While refraining in this paper 
from a detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the authenticity debate, I would like 
to examine in detail Peirce's analysis of the story and present, in a format more schematic than 
his own, the way in which his abductive reasoning unfolds. 
The present paper is divided into two-parts of disproportionate size: the first part reproduces 
the reports of the two ancients writers accompanied by some explanatory remarks; the second 
and longer section illustrates Peirce's own employment of these reports to illustrate his own 
logical method of abduction. The aim of the paper is to show in a concrete way how Peirce 
himself thought the method of abduction was to work.  Some final questions will be raised about 
its success. 
                                                 
1 P. Moraux, “Das Schicksal der Bibliothek des Aristoteles,” in his Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen (de 
Gruyter, 1973), pp. 3-94; I. Düring, "Notes on the History of the Transmission of Aristotle's Writings," Symbolae 
Philogiae Gotoburgenses, 66 (1955), pp. 37-71; F. Grayeff, "The Problem of the Genesis of Aristotle's Text," 
Phronesis 1 (1956), pp. 105-122; A.-H. Chroust, "The Miraculous Disappearance and Recovery of the Corpus 
Aristotelicum," Classica et Mediaevalia, 23 (1962), pp. 50-67. 
2The sections that will be considered in this paper are only a few of the whole piece entitled "The Logic of 
Drawing History from Ancient Documents."  The original title " The Logic of Drawing History from Ancient 
Documents especially from Testimonies" is subdivided into the following sections:  1). Abstract; 2). The Theory of 
Balancing Likelihoods; 3). Criticism of the Theory of Balancing Likelihoods; 4). The Logic of Science; 5). 
Regularity and Explanation; 6). Abduction, Induction, and Deduction; 7). Three Kinds of Induction; 8). Abduction; 
9). The Logic of History.   
All citations will be from the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. VII:  Science and Philosophy, 
ed. by A. Burks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958).  This volume is a continuation of the work done in 
the previous six volumes which were edited by Hartshorne and Weiss.  All citations will be to the section numbers 
of the text.  {To the best of my knowledge, the new Peirce edition has not reached editing the material relevant to 
this topic.} 
1 
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PART ONE:  Ancient Reports 
Peirce's own summary of the reports of the transmission of the library is found in 7.234 of 
his works.  Perhaps it is worthwhile to reproduce the reports of both ancient writers before 
commenting on them. Strabo's report occurs in the Geography, 13.1.54 where he writes,  
"From Scepsis came the Socratic philosophers Erastus and Coriscus and Neleus the son of 
Coriscus, this last a man who not only was a pupil of Aristotle and Theophrastus, but also 
inherited the library of Theophrastus, which included that of Aristotle. At any rate, Aristotle 
bequeathed his own library to Theophrastus, to whom he also left his school; and he is the first 
man, so far as I know, to have collected books and to have taught the kings in Egypt how to 
arrange a library. Theophrastus bequeathed it to Neleus; and Neleus took it to Scepsis and 
bequeathed it to his heirs, ordinary people, who kept the books locked up and not even carefully 
stored.  But when they heard how zealously the Attalic kings, to whom the city was subject, were 
searching for books to build up the library in Pergamum, they hid their books underground in a 
kind of trench.  But much later, when the books had been damaged by moisture and moths, their 
descendants sold them to Apellicon of Teos for a large sum of money, both the books of 
Aristotle and those of Theophrastus.  But Apellicon was a bibliophile rather than a philosopher; 
and therefore, seeking a restoration of the parts that had been eaten through, he made new copies 
of the text, filling up the gaps incorrectly, and published the books full of errors.  The result was 
that the earlier school of Peripatetics who came after Theophrastus had no books at all, with the 
exception of only a few, mostly exoteric works, and were therefore able to philosophise about 
nothing in a practical way, but only to talk bombast about commonplace propositions, whereas 
the later school, from the time the books in question appeared, though  better able to philosophise 
and Aristotelise, were forced to call most of their statements probabilities, because of the  large 
number of errors.  Rome also contributed much to this; for, immediately after the death of 
Apellicon, Sulla, who had  captured Athens, carried off Apellicon's library to Rome, where  
Tyrannion the grammarian, who was fond of Aristotle, got it in his hands by paying court to the 
librarian, as did also certain booksellers who used bad copyists and would not collate the  texts -- 
a thing that also takes place in the case of the other books that are copied for selling, both here 
[at Rome] and  Alexandria."3 
This account, according to Peirce, "is confirmed"4 by the one given in Plutarch's Sulla  26:1-
3:  
"Having left Ephesus with all his ships, he [Sulla ] landed in the Piraeus on the third day, 
and after he was initiated into the Mysteries, took for himself the library of Apellicon of Teos 
which contained most of the books which were not yet  known to the public of Aristotle and 
Theophrastus. It is  said that after it was brought to Rome, Tyrannion the grammarian arranged 
the titles and Andronicus of Rhodes who received the writings from him published them and 
edited the titles which are  now current.  The older Peripatetics seem themselves to have  been 
cultured and learned, but they did not have access to many of the works of Aristotle and 
                                                 
3The Geography of Strabo, trans. by H.L. Jones (Cambridge, 1960), vol. 6, pp. 109-113. 
4See section .233. 
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Theophrastus nor were these clear.  This is because the inheritance of Neleus to whom 
Theophrastus left the books fell to men who were unworthy and uneducated."5 
In his own account Peirce tells us that Aristotle's will makes no mention of his library. 
Although Peirce himself merely mentions this in passing, the absence of any reference to a 
library in the will of Aristotle has become the focus of recent scholarly interest.6  Peirce then 
recounts that Theophrastus wills the library to Neleus of Scepsis -- something  clearly indicated 
in the testament of Theophrastus. After a considerable passage of time the books get edited, 
finally reaching the state in which they are employed in the later tradition.7  In short, Peirce 
presents a readable account of the information provided by the two ancient authors, 
supplementing their accounts with a few brief references to other writers  in antiquity.   
Part Two:  Peircean Analysis 
Peirce's aim is to illustrate how his theory of abduction functions in relating the present 
status of the corpus aristotelicum to the reports of ancient writers.  He outlines his basic theory of 
                                                 
5See the remarks by R. Flaceliere and E. Chambry in Plutarque: Vies (Paris, 1971), Tome VI. According to the 
comment on p. 219, Plutarch would not be an independent confirmation of the story since, according to the editor, 
he uses Strabo as a source: "mais je suis persuadé que les détails donnés par Plutarque dans le passage 
immediatement précédent (26:1-3) sur la destinée des livres d'Aristote et de Théophraste sont empruntés aussi a 
Strabon, 13,1,54: la même dénomination d'idiotai anthropoi appliquée aux héritiers de Nelée de Skepsis se lit chez 
Strabon et chez Plutarque." He repeats this in his comment on p. 339, noting the Strabo passage and adding, "(ce 
doit être ici la source de Plutarque)."  Whether the single expression 'uneducated men' be taken as sufficient 
evidence of a dependency relation is a matter for the reader to decide. 
6A.-H. Chroust, "Estate Planning in Hellenic Antiquity: Aristotle's Last Will and Testament," Notre Dame 
Lawyer, vol. 45 (1970), p.661: "According to Strabo, Aristotle donated his personal library to Theophrastus, 
probably at the time he fled Athens, perhaps in order to indicate that he wanted Theophrastus to be his "successor". 
Since Aristotle was a metic in Athens, under the existing Athenian laws he could not have owned any real property 
there. The Lyceum was a 'municipal' building and, hence, was not his to bequeath."  Also on p. 653 ft. 103 he writes: 
'While the preserved wills of Theophrastus, Straton of Lampsacus, and Lycon, all scholars of the Peripatus, are 
replete with provisions regarding the 'school' and the school property, Aristotle's will makes no reference whatever 
to such a 'school' or school property (or library) or, for that matter, to any property in Athens. For the whole history 
of Western philosophy this fact constitutes probably the most important aspect of Aristotle's last will and testament.  
It might compel historians of Ancient philosophy to radically revise (and discard) the cherished thesis that Aristotle 
had a distinct school in Athens over which he presided."  On the basis of this lacuna in the will and the accounts of 
transmission, Chroust speculates in his later work, Aristotle (London, 1973), 1, xi-xii, "Presumably, at some future 
time, we might, whether we like it or not, be compelled to rename the present Corpus Aristotelicum and call it more 
discriminatingly Corpus Scriptorum Peripateticorum Veterum, that is, a 'collection' of writings which not only 
includes authentic Aristotelica, but in all likelihood also contains authentic Peripatetica. In other words, in the light 
of Theophrastus' last will and testament (D. L. V. 52), this 'collection' might also contain compositions of the Early 
Peripatetics (down to approximately the year 287-6 B.C.). 
7It is this passage of time which leads Chroust to think of multiple authorship. Not only Chroust is of this 
opinion. F. Grayeff (see ft. 1) presents the thesis that the two editors, Tyrannion and Andronicus, gathered material 
from different sources for their editions of Aristotle, i.e., from the centers at Rhodes, Athens, and Alexandria. 
Consequently what we do possess is not from the hand of Aristotle alone.  In his Aristotle and His School (New 
York, 1974), p.82 he writes: 
"It appears, therefore, that Andronicus's edition of the corpus reflects the teaching not only of Aristotle, but of 
two or three generations of Peripatetic philosophers. Nevertheless, Andronicus published his edition as the sole work 
of Aristotle. Nor could he have done otherwise because, at least since Apellico's time, the treatises had been known 
as the work of Aristotle." 
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historical research, one which he hopes will be more fruitful than the method employed by many 
of his contemporaries. The unhappy results of many nineteenth century historians suggested to 
him that a different method must be employed, one that would not permit historians to ignore 
positive evidence in favor of probabilities supporting a theory which they found more preferable.  
In order to support his position Peirce engages in an elaborately developed application of his 
theory to the case of the Aristotelian library noted above.  Peirce does first set forth the principles 
that regulate the formation of an hypothesis (in this case, the hypothesis that Strabo does explain 
the textual difficulties encountered in reading Aristotle).  However, he seldom refers back, in an 
explicit way, to the principles he outlines in the prior, methodological, part of his paper, and thus 
it is sometimes difficult to see what rules justify each particular move in the application of his 
method.  These principles will be discussed first and then their interaction with the particular 
case in question will be examined.  The method that historians were employing at the time the 
article was written (1901) rested on the theory of balancing likelihoods (henceforth TBL).  This 
method he explains through a brief summary and an example.  Peirce does not devote a great 
deal of time to sorting out the difficulties inherent in this approach, since his aim is to present his 
own method, one that might avoid the glaring mistakes attached to the use of his opponent's 
method (7.169). Nonetheless, he does provide some criticisms of it. 
His criticisms of this method are expressed in paragraphs .176-182. First, he notes that the 
method of balancing likelihoods is unsuccessful in the study of ancient history precisely because 
the evidences, especially testimonies, offered as facts are very seldom independent.  By this, 
Peirce seems to mean more than the mere dependence of one author on another author, for even 
the TBL has a problem with such procedure.  In such a case, an author, in reporting an event, is 
often relying for his information upon a contemporary or some former author, and it would be 
illegitimate to set forth all the testimones received as if they were all of equal and independent 
value.  For instance, it would be incorrect to balance three independent sources which are 
opposed to a certain position against five interdependent sources which are supportive of the 
same position and conclude in favor of this latter position as having the greater probability.  
Peirce notes that the real problem is the difficulty of finding testimony that is not influenced by 
the author's own attitude regarding the antecedent probability of a certain account (event).   Thus, 
he notes, the accounts of Thales' life, in which the Pre-Socratic reportedly falls into a ditch while 
speculating on the heavens, might indeed be influenced by the Greek conception of the wise 
man.  For all that, it need not invalidate the accuracy of the account.8  Second, there is no way of 
determining the credibility of an author when he relates a certain event, even if one summons up 
his whole record of reporting as witness to his reliability or inaccuracy. The author must be 
considered as standing in a unique relation to each state of affairs that is narrated, and therefore 
statistics are of no help in ascertaining whether what is being reported in a particular case is true 
or false. Third, the method of history should not employ the demonstrative kind of reasoning, yet 
this is what is being attempted, Peirce maintains, even when one uses a calculus of probabilities.  
To avoid these difficulties, Peirce will urge that his own abductive method be employed.  In 
this way, Peirce argues, man will be able to learn from history, rather than remain confined 
within the limits of his own preconceptions of the past, preconceptions which will sometimes 
force him to reject outright as false information which is really factual (7.181 and 182 ft. 7).  
                                                 
8Peirce notes (.176): "Of all the modern mathematicians whom I have known, there have been perhaps not over 
one in five, of whom I should not hesitate to believe such a thing." 
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Peirce's own method for studying history is best summarized in the abstract which precedes the 
article as it appears in the Collected Papers:  "This scientific procedure consists, according to 
Mr. Peirce, in carefully framing a hypothesis, in tracing out the experiential consequences of that 
hypothesis, and in testing those consequences by comparison with facts not taken into account in 
the formation of the hypothesis." (7.163)  One can see respectively in this summary the three 
types of reasoning put forward by Peirce as constitutive of the scientific method: abduction,  
deduction, and induction.9  However, the first type of reasoning (abduction) plays a key role in 
the historical enterprise. A person is presented with a number of disparate facts which he wishes 
to unify into some theory; the historian wishes to find something that will explain an otherwise 
confused and tangled situation. Thus, the historian differs from the natural scientist who is often 
engaged  in supporting some general law by means of which similar phenomena can be 
understood (induction), and he differs from the mathematician who is already in possession of a 
theory and is primarily engaged in deducing its consequence (deduction).  Peirce insists on the 
distinction between induction and abduction and notes how they are unfortunately lumped 
together, and indicates how their methods are opposed.  Abduction starts with facts and moves to 
an explanatory hypothesis.  Induction starts from a hypothesis and moves to supportive facts.  As 
he succinctly puts it, "Abduction seeks a theory.  Induction seeks for facts." (.218) 
A more detailed analysis of Peirce's theory of scientific method in general or even his theory 
of abduction in particular cannot be given here. What is germane and important, however, is that 
Peirce furnishes us with some criteria which are supposed to guide a person in adopting (both 
choosing and testing) an hypothesis that will be suitable for explaining certain historical 
phenomena, in this case, the condition of the Aristotelian corpus. 
Peirce enumerates six rules that should be followed when engaging in the process of 
hypothesizing (7.225 - 7.230).  After adding to this list a rule to which he had pointed  earlier, we 
arrive at the following list:  
R0). The hypothesis proposed should be capable of being submitted to experimental 
verification.10 
R1). The hypothesis should be able to explain all the facts relevant to the case in point.11 
R2). The investigator must maintain that the principal testimonies are true unless or until the 
opposite is established.12 
R3). Hypotheses with objective probabilities of a high degree should be favored while those 
that have only a subjective probability or an objective probability of a low degree should be 
dismissed.13 
                                                 
9These are developed in sections .202-206. 
10See earlier .220.  Peirce makes reference  to the positivist Comte who wishes to exclude any "metaphysical 
hypothesis".  This would be one "which has no experiential consequences." (.203) 
11"Now the first rule which we should set up is that our hypothesis ought to explain all the related facts." (.225)  
Again, see also .220. 
12"The second rule is that our first hypothesis should be that the principal testimonies are true; and this 
hypothesis should not be abandoned until it is conclusively refuted." (.226) 
13"The third rule will be that probabilities that are strictly objective and at the same time very great, although 
they can never be absolutely conclusive, ought nevertheless to influence our preference for one hypothesis over 
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R4). Each item of an hypothesis should be tested singly.14 
R5). Of two hypotheses of equal merit, an expansion and intensified examination of the 
facts should be the arbiter.15 
R6). Financial consideration demands that generally the hypothesis which can be most 
economically tested be the first submitted to examination.16 
It is possible to add to these a principle (hypothesis) that, Peirce says, seems to guide all 
reasoning: "That hypothesis is that the facts in hand admit of rationalization, and of 
rationalization by us." (.219) Though Peirce here clearly enumerates these rules, it is not always 
clear, as was already mentioned, how they function in the example provided by Peirce.  
Furthermore, the sense of verification (R0) that is operative when dealing with historical 
accounts is somewhat elusive and tied to an  ambiguity of the term "fact" which is present in 
Peirce's account and  which seems to raise a problem for his methodology. 
Let us now turn to the detailed example that Peirce provides which  should incorporate the 
above rules and how, in the concrete, what the Logic of History is. Peirce first brings before our 
eyes, "the facts to be explained." (7.233)  Now a "fact" in this article, can be understood either as 
something which serves solely to be the data for some explanatory theory, i.e., the explananda, or 
it can be understood as evidence which serves in the confirmation of a theory. In the present  
passage it is obvious that Peirce is using it in the former sense, and  that in doing so Peirce is 
being consistent with his theory of abduction which demands that one start from the facts and 
seek an explanation  of them. Peirce goes on to list in section .233, it seems, some troubling facts 
about  the Aristotelian corpus and to account for these he invokes the passage in Strabo that 
contains, in his estimation, a plausible explanation.  These facts can probably be reduced to four 
major ones and enumerated as follows: 
F1). Diogenes Laertius reports that the Aristotelian corpus had 146 titles whereas the works 
we possess comprise only a third of this total.17 
F2). Ancient writers note that Aristotle's work had a rather elegant style whereas the works 
we have today manifest a very dry academic style.18 
                                                                                                                                                             
another; but slight probabilities, even if objective, are not worth consideration; and merely subjective likelihoods 
should be disregarded altogether. For they are merely expressions of our preconceived notions. Now one of the main 
purposes of studying history ought to be to free us from the tyranny of our preconceived notions."(.227) 
14" The fourth rule will be that we should split up a hypothesis into its items as much as possible, so as to test 
each one singly." (.228)  
15" The fifth rule will be that when we are in doubt which of two hypotheses ought to have precedence, we 
should try whether, by enlarging the field of facts which they are to explain, a good reason will not appear for giving 
one of them a decided preference over the other." (.229)  
16" The sixth rule will be that if the work of testing a particular hypothesis will have substantially or largely to 
be done in any case, in the process of testing another hypothesis, that circumstance should, other things being equal, 
give this hypothesis which thus involves little or no extra expense, a preference over another which would require 
special work of no value except for testing it." (.230)  See also .220. 
17"Diogenes Laertius gives a catalogue of the writings of Aristotle, probably made in Alexandria, (but the date 
of it is a matter for conjecture,) which contains 146 titles, which Diogenes says had 445,270 lines, which would be 
more than three times the size of our edition. Yet this catalogue  does not seem to refer to any large part of the 
substance of the works that we possess." 
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F3). A great deal of repetitiousness (both of passages and chapters) exists in the corpus.19 
F4). In the corpus there is reciprocal referencing to the works by Aristotle.20 
Now although there may appear to be only four facts to deal with, the issue of how one is to 
individuate a fact must be kept in mind.  It is easy to generate a much larger body of data to be 
explained by subdividing the remarks of Peirce so that further distinct items emerge as 
significant explananda in this enterprise.  Thus, the following seem to be easily formulated on 
the basis of the Peirce text.  Their correlation with, or similarity to, one of the previous 
statements F1 – F4 should be clear from their denominative enumeration: 
F1a).  Reference is not made in the catalogue of Diogenes to a significant number of the 
works we possess. 
F2a).  Aristotle was known in Antiquity by a number of works which we do not possess. 
F3a).  Some lost works presumably agree substantially with works retained in the corpus. 
F3').  "Intramural" repetition within the corpus: 
F3'a).  Repetition of whole books. 
F3'b).  Repetition of whole work. 
F3'c).  Repetition of passages. 
F3'd).  Repetition of definitions.   
F3'').  "Extramural" repetition:  repetition between the lost works and the corpus. 
Peirce does not give detailed citations from the corpus to support these remarks.  However, 
it is relatively easy to find support for each of them.  Consider only a few. (F2a) is established by 
citations from a whole range of authors in Antiquity, such as Plutarch, Alexander Aphrodisias, 
Cicero, Diogenes Laertius, etc.  One need only consult one of the many editions of Aristotle's so-
called "lost works" which have appeared during the last two centuries to establish that, indeed,  
there seem to have been a number of pieces which we simply do no longer possess as integral 
works.21  Important works widely recognized in Antiquity would be Arisotle's Protrepticus and 
                                                                                                                                                             
18"Moreover, down to the time of Cicero, Aristotle, whose reputation was more Roman than Greek, was chiefly 
known by works which we do not possess. The style of those works, as it is described, and as we see it in the 
fragments, was highly artistic; while that of the general mass of the works we possess is harsh and excessively 
condensed." 
19"The works we possess are also extremely repetitious. More than once, a whole book, or even a whole work, 
is substantially written again. And of the lost works, some, we are told by those who had seen them, agreed in 
substance with some of those in our possession. Shorter passages, and especially definitions, are often repeated 
almost verbatim." 
20"Our Aristotle abounds in references to his own works, sometimes to lost works, but mostly apparently to the 
works we know under other titles, but the nomenclature of the titles in the references presents no fixity; the same 
work will receive from Aristotle himself various names,-unless he means to refer to some works that we do not 
know." 
21One of the most widely available is the W.D. Ross edition, Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta (Oxford: 1955).  A 
translation exists in the older Oxford Aristotle. A newer collection (in English) is found in the Jonathan Barnes 
edition (translation) of Aristotle.  Other scholarly Greek editions are found in the Teubner edition as well as the 
more recent Berlin edition by O. Gigon.    
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the Eudemus.  (F3'a) is illustrated by the well-known duplication of books between the 
Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics. Or, it can be exemplified by comparing the On Ideas (a lost 
work) with Metaphysics I, 9  where Aristotle presents his criticism of Plato's theory of Ideas;  G. 
Fine has recently published a commentary on the former work and one can see the similar 
interest and substantive similarity between these.  (F3'c) is illustrated by the effective replication 
of parts of Book V of the Physics and Book XI of the Metaphysics. Definitions are frequently 
repeated even within the same work. 
Now these facts, Peirce thinks, are somewhat unquieting; they are explananda searching for 
a hypothesis. An adequate hypothesis to explain  these facts, he believes, is found in the account 
given above by Strabo of the journey, adventures, and mishaps which the Aristotelian library 
underwent from the time of the death of Theophrastus to the editing of  Andronicus (.234).  It 
should be noted here that though the story put forward by Strabo is a fact in the sense that it is a 
document or testimony to be dealt with, it stands in an explanatory relationship to the other facts 
related above; indeed, it is these facts which turn the investigator's attention to this story as a 
plausible explanation of the  problems of the Aristotelian corpus. 
After having proposed a hypothesis that is capable of being in some way experimentally 
verified (Rl), it is incumbent upon the investigator to actually submit that hypothesis to the test.  
However, Peirce first dispenses with certain preliminary objections (PO) to the hypothesis before 
it should be admitted on probation.  They are the following: 
PO1). If all Aristotle's work were in only a single collection, how could some be otherwise 
known to the librarian? 
PO2).  How is cross-referencing to be explained? 
PO3).  How could have the editor been able to determine some works as spurious? 
PO4).  How explain the evidence of two separate acquisitions of the library? 
Peirce readily finds answers to these and proceeds to the serious examination of the 
hypothesis.   
In seeking support for the hypothesis, Peirce would seem to have available two sources: a) 
the reports by other ancient authors corroborating  the veracity of Strabo's account;22 b) the 
present Aristotelian corpus itself to provide internal evidence. Now Peirce does not develop the 
first line of evidence, though other writers (he mentions Plutarch, Athenaeus, and Porphyry) 
report substantially the same story that Strabo does. He does argue extensively, however, from 
the state of the corpus in support of the Strabo story.  Rather than speak of evidence, however, he 
speaks of "consequences" which follow from it.23  At this point Peirce's terminology seems to 
become somewhat fluid.  He seems to think that there are two major "consequences" which 
would follow on the veracity of the story.  The first consequence (C1) deals with the type (style) 
of works that Aristotle would have produced and the length of the individual papyrus sheets on 
                                                 
22Perhaps it was the facile use by historians of multiple sources as automatically constituting corroborative 
evidence that made Peirce hesitant in using this first line.  As he noted, the problem of achieving genuine 
independence (not only vis-à-vis the possible mutual interdependence of ancient writers but also vis-à-vis the 
dependence of each author on prior assumptions) is a basic one. 
23"Having thus reviewed all the supposed difficulties of this hypothesis and having found that they are not 
serious, we may admit it upon probation, and proceed to trace out its consequences." (.239) 
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which he wrote them.  The second consequence (C2) deals with the filing and storage of these 
sheets.  It is difficult to formulate these in two simple statements, simply because they are 
actually quite complex; Peirce's statement of them is relatively diffuse.  In addition, it seems that 
he makes a significantly large number of assumptions in their formulation.  For instance, with 
regard to (C1) Peirce assumes that the type of works "should be expected [italics mine] to belong 
to" unfinished works, lecture notes, outlines of theories, etc.(.239)  He then engages in an 
elaborate and ingenious tabulation of the number of lines per papyrus sheet.24 With regard to 
(C2) Peirce has to make a number of assumptions regarding the pasting and storage of the 
papyrus sheets.  These two consequences seem to be foundation for some others.  However, 
these others he seems to refer to as "phenomena to which our hypothesis points".  One is tempted 
to think of these as constituting pieces of evidence for the hypothesis.  Perhaps being a 
phenomena relative to, and being a piece of evidence in support of, a given hypothesis is simply 
the case of being a "grue" property – what is a predictable phenomena becomes evidence when 
confirmed.  Given the supposition of the Strabo account about the library's history and editing, 
one might, then, refer to the following as phenomena (P) or as evidence (E) in support of that 
account:  
Pl).  Errors or banalities where something more insightful/original was expected. 
P2).  Errors or puzzling occurrences often at about 70 Bekker lines. 
P3). Transposition of certain passages often at about 70 Bekker lines. 
P4).  Regular omissions of matter of page length size. 
Peirce turns his attention to the corpus, specifically to the Prior Analytics, to find instances 
which would exemplify omissions (P4) and transpositions (P3) and readily finds examples for 
both.  He then begins to examine the text for some blunders (P1,P2).25  He lights on a fascinating 
example in one of the later chapters, c. 25, where he takes up Aristotle's analysis of abduction 
(apagoge) and argues that the only way to make good sense of the passage is to suppose that the 
text had been  altered.26  Peirce remarks at .251 that, "Such a singular corruption of the text could 
hardly have taken place without an Apellicon; but with him, it was easy enough."   In the end, 
Peirce concludes that his method has proved far superior to that of the German historians who 
have discounted the Strabo report and, in doing so, have ended up only, "believing whatever they 
are inclined to believe." (.255) 
CONCLUSION: Final Evaluation 
How successful is Peirce's account?  Leaving aside the historical accuracy of the Strabo for 
the moment, one must ask whether Peirce has successfully carried through his investigation and 
                                                 
24This is really so intricate that it could well deserve a paper itself.  He first selects certain works of the corpus 
upon which to speculate, counts their length in terms of Bekker lines, adds space for titles to the works, leaves room 
for a "fudge factor" to cover variation in normal handwriting, etc.  
25Peirce does not, it seems, clearly raise separate cases for each of these. 
26The syllogism appears to be "Whatever is equal to a rectilineal figure [E] is (able) to be squared [D]; a circle 
[F] is equal to a rectilineal figure; thus, a circle is is (able) to be squared," where the letters stand for the usual 
middle, major, minor. Peirce insists that "equal to lunes" be substituted for [D].  (The lune is a crescent-like shape 
drawn around a circle.)  
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justified the hypothesis which he proposed.  One way to answer this is to consider whether the 
rules he provided above were followed and are adequate. 
Peirce proposed a hypothesis that was capable of being tested (though admittedly in a way 
different from the procedures of the physical sciences) and thus fulfilled (R0). He accepted the 
principal testimonies as true, viz., that of Strabo and those of the other writers (R2). He was not 
blindly following some preconception is adopting this hypothesis or following current sentiment 
against it to reject it a priori (R3).  He found that his hypothesis was able to explain the facts and 
even deviations that might stand in the way of its acceptance (R1).27  The question of the cost in 
verifying the hypothesis can be bracketed as not really all important to the present topic (R6). 
Thus, it seems that all Peirce must show is that the testing of the hypothesis has conformed to 
Rules 4 and 5; he will then be able to say that he has successfully carried through with his 
method and shown the truth of the proposed hypothesis. However, it is precisely at this point that 
difficulties begin to arise and the ambiguity noted earlier in the sense of "fact," "phenomena" 
becomes crucial. 
One wonders why Peirce did not include what were the the facts which serve as confirming 
evidence (Pl, P2, P3 and P4) among the original facts which were the data (Fl, F2, F3, F4).  The 
former are as equally given in the text as the latter. Now, the problem of distinguishing data from 
evidence does not arise in the same way when dealing with the physical sciences. In the case of a 
scientific abduction, a hypothesis is made on the basis of certain given (present) facts and one is 
able to predict (or retrodict), on the basis of that hypothesis, facts that are not present but which 
are sought to confirm that hypothesis. In the case of working by internal evidence from the 
Aristotelian corpus, however, it becomes clear that one is presented with the whole corpus and to 
decide which passages in it are to be taken as data and which as evidence might appear wholly 
arbitrary. In response to this Peirce might maintain that a general overview of the corpus 
indicates there is some problem and allows for the generation of an explanatory hypothesis 
which, in turn, allows one to make "predictions" about the state of certain parts of the texts, 
which predictions will be supported by an inspection of particular passages. 
A greater difficulty presents itself, however, when one considers that there need be no 
immediate connection between what is brought forward as evidence in support of an hypothesis 
and the hypothesis itself. Peirce wishes to maintain that the Strabo account will be supported by 
the regularity of the occurrence of troublesome passages (P2), the seeming disappearance of 
passages of a certain length (P4), and the transpositions of certain chapters (P3).  It must be 
noted, however, that these can only count as confirming evidence for the major hypothesis given 
in Strabo if other hypotheses are made which tie these to the main hypothesis. For instance, as 
noted above, Peirce conjectures that each page which Aristotle wrote contained about 70 Bekker 
lines of script. He conjectures that the original manuscript were rolled before storage.  Both of 
these conjectures allow him to explain, given the account of Strabo, the regularity of the 
occurrence of the trouble spots in the text: moths were able to bore through a single place in the 
rolled manuscripts and thereby destroy the-text so that, when unrolled, portions would be 
missing at regularly repeating intervals (P2;P1).  Similarly, the size of the sheets will explain 
how some sections were lost (P4) and how others were reshuffled (P3). Thus, rather than a single 
hypothesis, there is a whole network of hypotheses that come into operation; how they are each 
                                                 
27As he claims in .235-238. 
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warranted is not always clear and thus the question arises whether R4 is really being observed.  
Moreover, one begins to suspect that there is some fundamental circularity lurking in the method 
Peirce is employing.  This becomes particularly clear in his discussion of the syllogism in the 
Prior Analytics.  In order to make this understandable, Peirce maintained that one must alter the 
text to find it a viable instance of apagoge (abduction).  Peirce feels justified in making this 
change insofar as, given Strabo's account, he will be amending the corrupt text of Apellicon and 
returning to the accurate original reading intended by Aristotle. The problem is that Peirce will 
then go on to use this as evidence for the veracity of the account given by Strabo. He writes, "If 
we accept it [this changed reading ], it affords a remarkable confirmation of the Scepsis story; 
because of the bold insertion it supposes to have been made in the text." (.253 - italics mine) 
Without admitting such a corruption of the text, one might be able to explain the syllogism's 
wording as consequent upon Aristotle having written it in haste, or because the Analytics were 
notes not yet ready for publication -- the latter being an assumption that Peirce himself is ready 
to employ in another context.  
In support of Peirce's examination one can argue that he does uphold (R4) to the extent that 
he at least tries to examine the immediate consequence of the hypothesis by calculating the size 
of papyri through a detailed counting of Bekker lines.  Further, Peirce could argue that it is not 
really a strange notion that one hypothesis should support another. He notes in his article on 
"Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis" an instance from physical science where one hypothesis 
is supported by another, namely, the kinetical theory of gases which "is supported by the 
mechanical theory of heat." (2.639) Peirce, then, will argue that a theory is warranted insofar as 
it is able to explain the most facts in the simplest way; the best theory will be one that has both 
breadth and incomplexity. To achieve this one might be required to draw up other hypotheses, 
but by doing so an investigator will only be searching for the best hypothesis, the best 
explanation and could be construed as following Rule 5, if the hypotheses in question be seen as 
co-operative subordinate ones rather than competitive co-ordinate ones. 
Whatever its weaknesses, Peirce's argumentation and his focus on the principles and method 
in doing history scientifically show not only how his theory of abduction might be applied but 
also how a reflective method can lead a historian to new insights. 
